The Nizari ‘Assassins’: Myth and Murder in the Twelfth-Century Near East

On the evening of Wednesday 6 September 1090, five years before the First Crusade was called, the Shi’a missionary Hasan-i Sabbah slipped unnoticed into the seemingly impregnable mountain fortress of Alamut. After peacefully converting the inhabitants of the Persian stronghold, and removing its Sunni master, he began to build a movement that would become shrouded in myth. The group that would come to be known as the ‘Assassins’ would play a significant role in the politics of the Levant for the next one hundred and fifty years.

Describing Hasan as a ‘Shi’a missionary’ only tells part of the story. Since the early 1070s, Hasan had been a devotee of the Isma’ili, the more radical half of a schism in Shi’ism dating back to the 8th century. More esoteric and mystical than other branches of Islam, the Isma’ilis believed that the Qur’an had a deeper spiritual meaning beyond the text itself, hidden from the human intellect. Isma’ili Shi’ism thus placed figures of spiritual authority on a supreme pedestal, particularly the Shi’a Imam. The 11th century saw Hasan’s branch of Islam at the absolute summit of its influence. From the 10th century, Isma’ili Shi’ism spread across the coast of North Africa, beginning in modern Tunisia, crystallising in the formation of the Fatimid Caliphate. The Caliphate, centred on Egypt, would be a major power in the region for over two centuries. Opposition to the Fatimids, however, particularly from their sworn enemies within Islam, would be unwavering. At the beginning of the 11th century, the Seljuk Turks roared into the Levant. The eastern nomads were formidable, sweeping all before them in Persia and Mesopotamia. Their conquest of Baghdad in 1055 saw them appropriate the leadership of Sunni Islam from the decayed remnants of the Abbasid regime. Confrontation with the Shi’a Fatimids was inevitable. 1071 saw the Turks totally crush the Byzantine Empire at Manzikert. This triggered a decade of typically brutal civil war in Constantinople, opening central Anatolia for Seljuk settlement.

By the mid-1070s, whilst the Sunni Turks tightened their grip around Hasan’s Persian homeland, the Shi’a caliphate was in a deep period of uncertainty. Under constant threat from their Seljuk neighbours and beset by famine and rebellion, the Fatimid Caliph al-Mustansir was forced to cede nearly all power to his vizier, al-Jamali, who then ensured some stability. Islamic biographer Ibn Khallikan, writing in the 13th century, argued that Fatimid decline was evident from 1074: “the authority of al-Mustansir had been greatly enfeebled, and the affairs of the Empire had fallen into disorder”. The weakening of the foremost Isma’ili Shi’a power in the world was on full display to Hasan when he visited Cairo in 1078. It was clear to him that the Caliphate did not have the capacity to support its Isma’ili brethren trapped in Sunni-controlled Persia. He thus decided to take matters into his own hands. Hasan’s desire to openly revolt against the Seljuks was, of course, motivated by irreconcilable religious differences, but it was also a product of a form of nationalism. He saw the Turks as a grave threat to Persian national culture. His movement would become the first major Muslim community to adopt Persian as their primary language.

Twelve years after his arrival in Cairo, Hasan-i Sabbah had begun the task of tearing the Seljuk Empire apart from within. He took the mountain stronghold of Alamut in northern Persia and began converting the inhabitants of the surrounding countryside. The fortress was an ideal location from which to base an insurgent movement in a hostile land. It dominated the surrounding fertile valley, only properly accessible through a narrow mountain pass. Alamut was truly impregnable; it would never be taken by force. Hasan’s movement would make fortress acquisition the primary means of expansion. When fortresses had been taken, Isma’ili preachers would convert the inhabitants of the surrounding villages. Forts provided essential protection in otherwise hostile Sunni territory. These formed a network: a unique form of decentralised society, providing bases for mobile armed groups.

Hasan’s network expanded rapidly after the seizure of Alamut, partly enabled by the horror felt by the Persian people under Seljuk rule. The Turks were detested by the local population, often excessive in their taxation and visiting destruction and anarchy on villages within their territories. The Seljuks ensured that the country’s landless villagers and highlanders remained underprivileged. In the newly acquired Isma’ili territories, these people were treated more equitably. Loot acquired in campaigns was distributed equally, and often put towards collective projects, such as improving irrigation systems. With their popularity burgeoning, the 1090s presented an ideal opportunity to spread the insurgency movement. A series of crises meant the Islamic world was wracked by instability. In 1092, the Seljuk Sultan, Malikshah, and his vizier both died, pulling the Empire into a succession war. The civil war was fought in the far east of the Empire, giving Hasan and his followers some breathing room. The collapse of central Seljuk authority meant power was increasingly concentrated in the hands of local leaders, meaning Hasan was at less risk of being overwhelmed. 1094 was also a hugely significant year in wider Islamic politics, this time within the Fatimid dynasty. The Caliph-Imam, al-Mustansir, died in Cairo in 1094. His eldest son, Nizar, was acknowledged by the Isma’ilis as their next Imam. When he was passed over for the Fatimid throne, he rose in rebellion. Hasan and his followers lent their unconditional support to his cause, even after his rebellion was crushed in 1095, henceforth becoming known as the Nizaris.

Whilst effective in forming a network of fortresses, the practice which the group would become famous for was political murder, or ‘assassination’. Whilst the political instability of the 11th century made life easier for the Nizaris, they were still facing an enemy with overwhelmingly superior military power. Murdering key political leaders was critical to intimidating and destabilising enemy polities, justified through the bloodshed prevented among ordinary men on the battlefield. Assassination was hardly a strategy without cost. Murders often triggered bloody reprisals against Isma’ili communities, and senior political targets were always surrounded by guards in public spaces. The killer would almost certainly be cut down the instant he killed his target, if not before. The risks meant assassins were glorified and praised for their courage and piety by their fellow Isma’ilis. They were known as Fida’i, meaning ‘devoted ones’.

The 11th century saw the gradual expansion of the Nizaris into Syria. The famous fortress of Masayaf was captured in 1141, and a network was established. It was hardly a smooth process, however. They were heavily reliant on the patronage of local Muslim rulers, an approach which often backfired. In 1129, the Nizari contingent in Damascus were brutally ejected when their patron’s successor proved less than sympathetic. Thousands were killed, allegedly. Despite this, by the 1160s the Nizaris had an ingrained presence in Syria. It was under Rashid al-Din Sinan, the Nizari chief in Masayaf after 1164, that they would exert their greatest influence on the inter-religious politics of the region. Fatimid power had declined to a shadow of its former self, the Nizaris having killed several caliphs themselves over the previous fifty years. Pressure induced by the newly founded Crusader states and the rising Zengid dynasty in Syria crippled the Caliphate by the 1170s. The Ayyubid sultanate replaced it, under the stewardship of the legendary Saladin. Sinan made two attempts on the sultan’s life in the mid-1170s, both of which proved unsuccessful. Although alive, Saladin was intimidated enough that he began sleeping in a tall wooden tower built at the centre of his camp.

While the majority of Nizari targets were Muslim, their engagement with the newly founded Crusader states would be a crucial factor in their enduring legend. Their first known Latin target was Raymond II of Tripoli in 1153, a murder which would provoke a brutal response from the Knights Templar. As the Third Crusade drew to a close, the Nizaris claimed their most significant Frankish target: the yet-to-be crowned King of Jerusalem, Conrad of Montferrat. The attack was allegedly carried out by two assassins who disguised themselves as Christian monks, managing to win Conrad’s confidence. Although the motivation behind these murders remains unclear to historians, it is certain that they had a profound impact in the Crusader states.

Assassinations of any importance were attributed to the Nizaris. Their chief in Syria, Sinan, became known as the ‘Old Man of the Mountain’. Farhad Daftary’s The Assassin Legends: Myths of the Isma’ilis is essential for understanding how the Nizaris became so mythologised. As with much terminology in the pre-modern world, the ‘Assassins’ did not choose their title. It was instead imposed upon them by contemporaries and future chroniclers. The Franks latched on to the term Hashashins as their nobles were killed, hence the term ‘Assassins’. The term was attractive to the Frankish crusaders, as the use of the intoxicating drug hashish enabled them to explain the seemingly irrational behaviour of those Fida’i who carried out suicidal murders. The legend truly crystallised after Marco Polo’s travels, who combined several tropes to produce the enduring myth of the Isma’ili rebels. In his tale, the Nizaris were described as drug-addled lunatics who emanated from a ‘secret garden of paradise’, where their drugs were prepared. Of course, there was little truth in these stories. A profoundly intoxicating drug would have blunted the effectiveness of Nizari assassins, and there is no evidence pointing to a ‘secret garden of paradise’.

Daftary provides a convincing explanation for these myths. As the Nizaris belonged to a particularly uncompromising Shi’a sect, they faced a notably hostile literary campaign by rival Muslims. The hashish drug had been used in the Near East since ancient times and was associated with harmful effects on one’s morality. Its users were ascribed a lower social status in the Islamic world. The legend of the Hashashins was thus borne out of an unrepresentative insult, rather than a true description of reality. The persistence of the myth over the previous centuries is hardly surprising given our surviving source base. The Mongol hordes delivered the death blow to the Nizaris in 1256. Alamut’s surrender preceded the destruction of its library, meaning a vast corpus of Isma’ili literature is lost to us.

Whilst their medieval network may have been destroyed, the story of the Nizaris is one of dogged persistence. Hasan-i Sabbah’s bloodless capture of Alamut in 1090 marked the beginning of a movement that would consistently punch above its weight. Their innovative use of decentralised state structures maintained their survival in an overwhelmingly hostile environment, whilst their skill in political murder ensured they exerted influence disproportionate to their manpower. The story of Nizari resilience continues today, although their influence and network in no way resembles that of the 12th century. They are still the largest Isma’ili sect, with tens of millions of followers. Their numbers are scattered, forming minorities across several Asian countries and in areas of Africa. The medieval Nizaris have even taken on a life of their own in Western media. The legend manifested in the now long-running Assassin’s Creed series of video games, beginning in 2007.

Bibliography

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Christie, Niall Muslims and Crusaders: Christianity’s Wars in the Middle East, 1095-1382, from the Islamic Sources, (Taylor and Francis Group: 2020).

Daftary, Farhard, The Assassin Legends: Myths of the Isma’ilis (I.B Tauris: 1995).

Daftary, Farhad, The Isma’ilis: Their History and Doctrines, 2nd edition (Cambridge University Press: 2007).

Hillenbrand, Carol, The Crusades: Islamic Perspectives, (Edinburgh University Press: 1999).

Lewis, Bernard, The Assassins, A Radical Sect in Islam, (Weinfield & Nicolson: 1967).