The Oslo Accords and the Dangers of Extremism

In 2024, the relationship between Israel and Palestine is arguably at its lowest point. The humanitarian crisis in Gaza has led to a media and political environment where scepticism about the viability of a two-state solution is overwhelming. In 1993, when the Oslo Accords were signed, there was widespread optimism. Bill Clinton referred to it as the “peace of the brave.” By the end of the 1990s, however, progress had significantly stalled, setting the stage for the current situation.

The reasons why the Oslo negotiations failed to fulfil their initial promise are complex. A substantial body of literature offers extensive analysis and critique of the various Oslo agreements. This article specifically aims to explore the impact of radical action external to the negotiations.

The Oslo negotiations began in January 1993 and led to two significant outcomes later that year: mutual recognition letters exchanged between Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin and Yasser Arafat, the PLO leader, and the signing of the Declaration of Principles, also known as Oslo I. The declaration aimed to establish a Palestinian self-government authority (now the Palestinian Authority) to govern the West Bank and Gaza in the future. It also set a framework for subsequent permanent status negotiations on critical issues such as Jerusalem, Palestinian refugees, and West Bank settlements. In 1994, Israel withdrew from Gaza City and Jericho, and in 1995, the Interim Agreement was signed, providing more clarity on the powers and influence of the PA and the division of the West Bank.

These agreements were marked by ambiguities and problems too extensive to address in this article. However, a significant factor in the failure of the Oslo process was the interaction between radical action and the negotiation process. While the Oslo agreements seemed to signal a new era of cooperation, they were negotiated amid escalating Palestinian unrest. An Intifada (uprising) erupted in Gaza immediately after the first accord was signed. According to Charles Smith, “Gaza’s fury was fuelled by economic despair, as dependence on employment in Israel was compromised; Rabin imposed a full curfew in June 1993 that continued into January 1994, four months after the accord.” Suicide bombings throughout 1994 resulted in numerous Israeli casualties, leading to larger economic disruptions in Gaza and a shift in Israeli reliance from Palestinian labourers to workers from Asia and Eastern Europe. The economic collaboration was deteriorating just as diplomatic cooperation was becoming crucial.

The uprising was intensified by radical Islamic groups such as Hamas and Islamic Jihad, which opposed a two-state solution as it would leave some Israeli sovereignty over what they considered Palestinian land. Their actions aimed to disrupt the negotiations, resulting in frequent suicide bombings and significant loss of Israeli lives.

Similarly, opposition to the Oslo process also emerged within Israel. Since the beginning of Israeli settlement in the West Bank in 1967, a radical Orthodox settler movement had developed, with strong ideological ties to Judea and Samaria (the biblical names for the West Bank). This group viewed any concession of Israeli sovereignty as unacceptable. The 1995 Interim Agreement, which promised increased Palestinian control in the West Bank, prompted large settler demonstrations. Protesters accused Prime Minister Rabin of “crimes against the Jewish people.” Opposition leader Benjamin Netanyahu supported these protests, asserting that “no Jew has ever longed to give up parts of the homeland.” The worsening Palestinian unrest contributed to the assassination of Rabin by a Jewish extremist in November 1995. Rabin’s death paved the way for Benjamin Netanyahu’s Likud party to come to power in 1996, which was influenced by Orthodox settler groups, leading to a derailment of the Oslo process.

While Orthodox extremists and Islamist radicals did not have direct access to the negotiating process (until 1996), their influence was significant, even before the assassination. Eric N. Budd argues that extremist actions prevented moderates from fully committing to the negotiations. The lack of a unified position on either side created mistrust. Israelis had to make concessions to their radical constituents through new settlements whilst attempting to balance this with Palestinian interests. According to Budd, this ambiguity fostered doubts about the feasibility of a long-term peace partnership.

Overall, the Oslo experience serves as a cautionary tale. Although the current conflict seems further from resolution than ever, if moderates on both sides regain control, radical action and violence will remain a persistent threat. Extremism not only undermined trust in the negotiations but also created the context for Rabin’s assassination, which was pivotal in the progression of the Oslo process. While some argue that the Oslo accords were inherently flawed, resolving the conflict requires policymakers who can effectively counteract extremist groups. Without this, periods of optimism and progress may once again be squandered. 

Bibliography  

Budd, Eric N., Conflicted Are the Peacemakers: Israeli and Palestinian Moderates and the Death of Oslo(London: Bloomsbury Academic & Professional, 2014).

Smith, Charles D., Palestine and the Arab-Israeli Conflict (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 2012).

BBC News, ‘Rabin and Arafat Shake on Peace Deal’, BBC, 13 September 1993, http://news.bbc.co.uk/onthisday/hi/dates/stories/september/13/newsid_3053000/3053733.stm [accessed 12 August 2024].